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SHORESIDE COVERAGE UNDER THE LONGSHOREMEN'S
AND HARBOR WORKER'S COMPENSATION ACT'
In 1914, longshoreman Christen Jensen died of a broken neck
which he suffered when he failed to lower his head while driving an
electric freight truck through a hatchway of a steamship he was
unloading.' The fatal injury occurred on a gangway which connected
the vessel with the pier.' In Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,' the United
States Supreme Court reversed' an award of survivor benefits made
to Jensen's widow and two children under the New York Workmen's
Compensation Act. 6 Reasoning that the Constitution vested in Con-
gress the paramount power to determine the maritime law which shall
prevail throughout the country,' the Court held that it was uncon-
stitutional for the state of New York to apply its workmen's compen-
sation statute to an injury such as Jensen's which occurred over the
navigable waters of the United States!' Since Congress had never
created a federal maritime compensation remedy, liowever, the fensen
decision resulted in a significant gap in the coverage of maritime
workers: while longshoremen injured on land could seek a recovery
under the workmen's compensation law of that state, longshotemen
injured over the navigable waters were left without a compensation
remedy.6
In an attempt to correct this lack of coverage on the seaward
side of the pier, Congress enacted the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Worker's Compensation Act (LHWCA)" in 1927. Under this Act, an
injured longshoreman could recover benefits only if the accident oc-
curred upon the navigable waters of the United States" and if recov-
' Act of March 4, 1927, c. 509, 44 Stat. 1424, as amended by Longshoremen's
and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 92-576, 86 Stat.
1251, 33 U.S.C. 901 et seq. (Supp. 1976) (hereinafter cited "LHWCA," or "the Act").
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 208 (1917).
3 Id.
4 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
Id. at 218.
6 Chapter 67 of the Consolidated Laws as re-enacted and amended by Chapter
41 of the Laws of 1914, and as amended by Chapter 316 of the Laws of 1914. The
award of the New York Workmen's Compensation Commission had been affirmed
without opinion by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, 167 App. Div. 945,
152 N.Y.S. 1120 (1915),. and by the Court of Appeals, 215 N.Y. 514, 529, 109 N.E. 600,
604 (1915).
244 U.S. at 214-17.
O Id. at 217-18.
See, e.g., State Indus. Comm'n v. Nordenholt Corp., 259 U.S. 263, 272-73
(1922). The Supreme Court twice rejected congressional attempts to validate the appli-
cation of state remedies to longshoremen injured over the navigable waters. Knicker-
bocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 166. (1920); Washington v. W. C. Dawson &
Co., 264 U.S. 219, 228 (1924).
10 Act of March 4, 1927, c. 509, 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (1970).
" LHWCA § 3(a), 33 U.S.C. 903(a) (1970).
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ery for the disability or death through workmen's compensation pro-
ceedings could not validly be provided by state law." The statute was
thus a limited measure designed merely to plug the gap in coverage
left by the Jensen decision." The nature of the claimant's employment'
function was irrelevant to the determination of coverage." Rather, re-
covery under the Act was predicated on the maritime situs of the in-
jury, with coverage stopping at the water's edge.
Predicating coverage on the lone circumstance of whether the in-
jury occurred on land or over the water, however, resulted in an in-
congruous and entirely fortuitous application of the federal compen-
sation scheme." The additional fact that a disparity existed between
the benefits payable under the Act and those payable under various
of the state laws" meant that the fortuitous nature of the situs-based
federal coverage often resulted in individual injustices, as illustrated
by two separate incidents occurring in 1963. In that year, longshore-
man John Robert Vann died in a pier-based accident when a cable he
was lifting suddenly straightened out, catapulting him off the pier and
into the Elizabeth River where he drowned.' 2 Since Vann's death oc-
curred upon the navigable waters of the United States, his wife was
awarded survivor benefits under the LHWCA.' 8 During the same
year, longshoreman Joseph Klosek was also killed in a pier-based acci-
dent when a ten ton draft of steel beams being loaded onto a ship
swung back and struck him, lifting him into the air and dropping him
head first onto the pier."' Since Klosek's death had not occurred upon
the navigable waters, but rather had occurred on the pier—legally,
merely an extension of the landn—Klosek's wife was denied recovery
under the Act. 2 ' In Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 22 the Supreme
"Id. The statutory deference to state coverage resulted in the judicial creation of
a "twilight zone" of concurrent federal-state coverage of certain injuries. See, e.g., Davis
v. Department of Labor and Indus., 317 U.S. 249, 255-56 (1942); Calbeck v. Travelers
Ins. Co., 370 U.S. 114, 115-31 (1962). This overlapping jurisdiction existed only over
the navigable waters, however. The landward reach of federal jurisdiction under the
Act continued to be strictly enforced at the water's edge. For a general history, see G.
GILMORE & C. BLACK. THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 6-45 (2d ed. 1975) (hereinafter cited as
GILMORE & BLACK).
13 Parker v. Motor Boat Sales, Inc., 314 U.S. 244, 250 (1941).
" Pennsylvania R.R. v. O'Rourke, 344 U.S. 334, 340 (1953).
"See, e.g., Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Ousting, 398 F.2d 900, 911 (4th Cir.
1968) (dissenting opinion), rev'd sub nom. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S.
212 (1969).
Id Compare, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 906 (1964) (maximum disability compensation of sev-
enty dollars per week) with MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 152, § 34 (1958)as amended by Acts
of 1963, ch. 460, § I (maximum disability compensation of fifty-three dollars per week).
See also, Davis v, Department of Labor and Indus., 317 U.S. 249, 255 (1942); Marine
Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900, 907 (4th Cir. 1968).
IT Marine Stevedoring Corp. v. Oosting, 398 F.2d 900, 901-02 (4th Cir. 1968),
rev'd sub nom. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969).
"Id. at 909 (appeal of the Vann award was not taken to the Supreme Court).
"Id. at 902.
" Nacirema Operating Co, v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212, 214-15 (1969).
"Id. at 214.
" 196 U.S. 212 (1969).
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Court noted that there was much to he said for the uniform treatment
of longshoremen who were injured during the loading or unloading
of a ship. Nevertheless, the Court denied recovery under the Act for
Klosek's shoreside death." The Nacirerna Court concluded that while
Congress might have provided for shoreside coverage under the Act,
it had chosen instead "the line in Jensen separating water from land at
the edge of the pier." 24 The Court indicated that "[Ole invitation to
move that line landward must be addressed to Congress, not to this
Court."'" Thus, due to the strict situs-orientation of the Act, the Vann
death was covered under the more generous federal compensation
system" while the Klosek death was not, despite the fact that both
men were longshoremen killed in similar pier-based loading opera-
tions.
Acknowledging that amendments to the LHWCA were long
overdue," Congress effected a broad overhaul of the Act in 1972, 28
and extended coverage under the LHWCA to shoreside areas. 2" In a
clear rejection of the prior deference to state law, the proviso that re-
covery be granted only where state law does not furnish a valid
workmen's compensation remedy for the disability was deleted. The
"Id. at 223.
"Id. at 223-24.
23 ld. at 224.
22 Compare 33 U.S.C. § 909 (1964) (maximum survivor benefits of seventy dollars
per week) with, in Kiosek's case, MD. CODE ANN. Art. 101, § 36(8) (1957) (maximum
survivor benefits of forty-eight dollars per week) and, in Vann's case, VA. CODE ANN. §
65.1-65 (1950) as amended by 1962 Va. Acts ch. 503 (maximum survivor benefits of
thirty-seven dollars per week).
17 H. R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. Ik
Al), NEWS 4698, 4698.
1s 	and Harbor Worker's Compensation Act Amendments of
1972, Pub. L. 92.576, 86 Stat. 1251, 33 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (Supp. 1976).
19 LHWCA § 3(a), 33 U.S.C. 903 (a). In addition to the changes involved in ex-
tending coverage under the Act to shoreside areas, the 1972 amendments substantially
upgraded the level of benefits payable under the Act, compare 33 U.S.C. § 910 (1970)
with 33 U.S.C. § 910 (Supp. 1976), and eliminated both the longshoremen's right to
maintain an unseaworthiness action against the ship and the vessel's right to maintain
an indemnity action against the stevedore, the longshoremen's employer. 33 U.S.C. §
905(b) (Supp. 1976). The unseaworthiness remedy had allowed a longshoreman to re-
cover damages from a ship when he was injured due to the shipowner's failure to dis-
charge his absolute and non-delegable duty to maintain the vessel and all its appurte-
nances in a seaworthy condition. Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 92-95
(1946). Since the stevedore had impliedly contracted to perform workmanlike service
when he was hired to load or unload the vessel, however, the shipowner could recover
from the stevedore the money which he had been forced to pay the injured longshore-
man if the stevedore's actions had been responsible for the unseaworthy condition.
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 132.33 (1956). In
eliminating the unseaworthiness remedy and the indemnity action, the amendments ac-
complished a legislative overruling of Sieracki and Ryan, putting an end to the expensive
tripartite litigation which they had engendered. H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 4698, 4701-05.
The amendments also effected a number of administrative changes. For a com-
prehensive listing of all the 1972 changes see Note, MARITIME JURISDICTION AND
LONGSHOREMEN'S REmEntEs, 1973 WASH. U. L. Q. 649, 667 n.I01.
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coverage provision of the Act, section 3(a), now reads:
Compensation shall be payable under this chapter in re-
spect of disability or death of an employee, but only if the
disability or death results from an injury occurring upon
the navigable waters of the United States (including any ad-
joining pier, wharf, dry dock, terminal,. building way,
marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily used by
an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a
vessel)...."`
The amended Act thus presents a dual test for coverage. Claim-
ants must satisfy both a "status" test requiring that the claimant be an
employee as defined under the Act, and a "situs" test requiring that
the injury occur upon the parenthetically extended area of the navig-
able waters. Yet, while the amendments sweep coverage ashore, they
provide no precise tidemark measure of just how far the coverage ex-
tends. The present uncertainty surrounding the Act's landward reach
is significant in view of the fact that the 1972 amendments substan-
tially improved the benefit structure of the Act, 3 ' resulting in an
enormous disparity between the amount of compensation payable
under the Act and that payable under the various state laws. 32 Under-
standably then, the proper application of this dual test has been the
subject of considerable controversy, not only between injured claim-
ants and their employers, but also among the various circuit courts
which have considered the Act. 33 It is submitted that the resulting
a° LHWCA § 3(a), 33 U.S.C. § 903 (a) (Sup. 1976).
3 ' For twelve years prior to 1972, the maximum compensation for disability had
been frozen at seventy dollars per week. 33 U.S.C. § 906(b) (1970). See also, H.R. REP.
No. 144 i reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG & AD. NEWS 4698, 4700. The amended Act
provides that the maximum compensation for disability shall not exceed 200% of the
national average weekly wage as determined annually by the Secretary of Labor. 33
U.S.C. § 906(b).
32 The amount payable under the Amended Act, as explained in note 31 supra, is
in sharp contrast to the fixed amounts provided under most of the state laws. Stockman
v. John T. Clark & Son, Inc., 539 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1976) is a good illustration of the
significant disparity which usually exists between the amount payable under the Act and
that payable under a state statute. Under Massachusetts law, Stockman was entitled to
$80.00 a week, whereas under the LHWCA he was entitled to more than $180.00 a
week. Id. at 265. For the amounts payable by various states at the time the LHWCA was
amended, see H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS 4698, 4707.
33 To date, the question of coverage under the amended Act has been considered
by the courts of appeal for the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits.
See Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, Inc., 539 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1976), petition for cert.
filed, 45 U.S.L.W. 3332 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1976) (No. 76-571); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v.
Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted Northeast Marine Terminal Co.
v, Caputo, 45 U.S.L.W. 3408 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1976) (No. 76-444), and Intercontinental
Terminal Operating Co. v. Blundo, 45 U.S.L.W. 3408 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1976) (No. 76-454);
Sea•Land Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 540
F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976); I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Board, 529 F.2d 1080 (4th
Cir. 1975), reheard en balm, I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Board, 542 F.2d 903 (4th
Cir. 1976) petitions for cert. filed, Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Brown, 45 U.S.L.W. 3401
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confusion over the landward limit Of the Act's coverage serves to de-
feat the proper functioning of this federal compensation scheme. As
Mr. Justice Frankfurter once noted with respect to the LHWCA,
"[ably legislative scheme that compensates workmen or their Families
for industrial mishaps should be capable of simple and dependable
enforcement."34 Obviously that goal is frustrated when a claimant not
only races initial uncertainty as to which remedy to pursue, but, hav-
ing chosen the federal remedy, is then put to the delay and expense
of proving that his claim comes under the Act.
This comment will focus on the current judicial development of
the dual requirements of status and situs. 35 The various judicial con-
structions of those requirements will be set forth as they contribute to
an orderly discussion of shoreside coverage under the Act."
Throughout this examination, an attempt will be made to define that
coverage which Congress most likely intended, and which best. effec-
tuates the general purposes of the Act. 37
(U.S. Nov. 19, 1976) (No. 76-706) and Adkins v. LT.O. Corp., 45 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S.
Nov. 24, 1976) (No. 76-730); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533 (5th
Cir. 1976), petitions for cert. filed, P.C. Pfeiffer Co., Inc. v. Ford, 45 U.S.L.W. 3364 (U.S.
Nov, 8, 1976) (No. 76-641) and Halter Marine Fabrications, Inc. v. Nulty, 45 U.S.L.W.
3450 (U.S. Dec. 27, 1976) (No. 76.880); Weyerhauser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957 (9th
Cir. 1975), cert, denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3254 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1976). The courts' conclusions as
to the intended extent of the Act's shoreside coverage have differed significantly. It
seems that the only point of any real certainty to emerge so far is the observation of
Judge Friendly that, "(Oven the importance of the question, the number of courts of
appeals endeavoring to find an answer, and the divergence of opinion already man-
ifested, it seems unlikely that the opinion of any court of appeals will be the last word
to he said." Pittston, supra, at 39.
" Davis  v. Department of Labor and Indus., 317 U.S. 249, 258 (1942) (concur-
ring opinion). See also, the Introduction to the Report of the National Commission on
State Workmen's Compensation Laws, 118 CLING. REC. 26186 (1972).
3A It should be noted that the cases have presented other issues as well. The
courts have uniformly concluded that the extension of coverage to shoreside areas is
constitutional. See, e.g., Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 271 (1st
Cir. 1976); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 56-57 (2d Cir.
1976); Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs,
540 F.2d 629, 633 (3d Cir. 1976); LT,O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Board, 529 F.2d
1080, 1086 (4th Cir. 1975); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 544-46
(5th Cir. 1976). There is some disagreement, however, as to whether the Director of the
Office of Worker's Compensation Programs is a proper respondent. Compare I.T.O.
Corp. v, Benefits Review Board, 540 17,2d 903, 906.09 (4th Cir. 1976) with Jacksonville,
supra, at 546. See also, Pittston, supra, at 42-43 ni.5 (the government should settle the
question by tidying up its regulations).
" The Ninth Circuit's decision in Weyerhauser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 17.2cl 957 (9th
Cir. 1975), will not be discussed in this comment since that case involved a fact situation
totally different from those of the other cases. Gilmore was a "pondman," a type of
millworker, who was injured when he fell from a floating walkway while sorting logs
and feeding them into a sawmill. The Gilmore court denied recovery under the Act,.
concluding that the claimant was not an "employee" since his job did not have a realisti-
cally significant relationship to traditional maritime activity involving navigation and
commerce on navigable waters. Id. at 961-62.
" This is not to imply that the determination of' the Act's coverage is merely a
discretionary application of general principles; Congress has simply not set forth an ex-
plicit definition of the Act's coverage. See, e.g., Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, Inc.,
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I. THE STATUS REQUIREMENT
To recover under the amended Act, a claimant must be an
4 4employee". 3" Prior to 1972, this term was defined only to the extent
of specifically excluding certain persons from coverage under the
Act. 3" The status orientation of the amended Act, however, is re-
flected in the more explicit definition of "employee" now found in
section 2(3):
The term "employee" means any person engaged in
maritime employment, including any longshoreman or
other person engaged in longshoring operations, and any
harborworker including a ship repairman, shipbuilder, and
shipbreaker, . . 40
This requirement that a claimant be an employee seems to present
two demands—that the claimant's activity constitute "maritime em-
ployment," and that the claimant be "engaged in" that activity within
the meaning of the Act. These two elements of the status requirement
will be discussed separately.
A, Activity Constituting "Maritime Employment"
The 1972 amendments • represent the first use of the term
"maritime employment" within the definition of "employee". Since
Congress did not define the concept, the major problem facing the
courts in construing the scope of the amended Act has been to de-
termine what types of activity constitute "maritime employment." 4 '
The first significant appellate construction of this term was a panel
decision of the Fourth Circuit in I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Board:"
539 F.2d 264, 265 (1st Cir. 1976) ("The difficulty in determining Stockman's coverage
arises from the essential ambiguity of the 1972 amendments insofar as they describe, or
fail to describe, the employees for whom coverage is afforded."); Pittston Stevedoring
Corp. v. Dellaverintra. 544 F.2d 35, 41 (2d Cir. 1976); Sea-Land Service. Inc. v. Direc-
tor, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d 629, 634 (3d Cir. 1976) (in-
terpreting the scope of the amendments "a task of no little difficulty"); Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 540 (5th Cir. 1976). Rather, it almost seems as
if Congress intentionally left this determination to the courts. See, e.g., Stockman, supra,
at 274. In the absence of explicit legislative guidelines, individual determinations of
coverage are likely to depend to a greater degree upon pOlicy considerations and the
general purposes underlying the Act.
LHWCA § 3(a), 33 U.S.C. 903(a) (Supp. 1976).
39 The former definition read, "The term 'employee' does not include a master
or member of a crew of any vessel, nor any person engaged by the master to load or
unload or repair any small vessel under eighteen tons net." 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (1970).
" LHWCA § 2(3), 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (Supp. 1976).
4 ' It should be noted that this phrase has appealed in the definition of "em-
ployer" since passage of the LHWCA in 1927. 33 U.S.C. § 902(4) (1970). The concept
was not statutorily defined there either, however. Moreover, case law is of little assis-
tance in defining the concept since the former Act focused solely on the sites of the in-
jury and not on the nature of the claimant's employment function. See text at note 14,
supra. See also, Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 539 (5th Cir. 1976).
42 529 F.2cI 1080 (4th Cir. 1975), reheard en bane, 542 F.2(1 903 (4th Cir. 1976).
14U
SHORESIDE COVERAGE UNDER THE LHWCA
The procedural situation in I.T.O., as in each of the other cases de-
cided to date, involved employer appeals from orders of the Benefits
Review Board" awarding compensation under the Act to injured
claimants. The consolidated appeals in I.T.O. required the court to
decide the employee status of three claimants, each of whom had
been injured while performing a function in the overall process of
loading and unloading a vessel. 44
43 The Benefits Review Board was created pursuant to § 15(a) of the amended
Act, 33 U.S.C. § 915(a), to review orders of the administrative law judges. 33 U.S.C. §
921(b) (Supp. 1976). The Board's decisions are in turn reviewable by the court of ap-
peals for the circuit where the injury occurred. Id. at § 921(c). As noted, the Board
ruled that every claimant in all the cases discussed in this comment had satisfied both
the status and situs tests. As regards the status requirement, the Board has concluded
that all persons who are engaged in handling cargo which is in maritime commerce are
covered under the Act. See, e.g., Avvento v. Hellenic Lines. Ltd., 1 BRBS 174 (1974).
Cargo is considered to enter maritime commerce when it is first unloaded from a truck
or other carrier and is handled by terminal employees working on the situs area co-
vered under the Act, and waterborne cargo is considered to remain in maritime com-
merce until such time as it is taken from the terminal for further transshipment. Id. See
also the cases collected by Judge Craven in I.T.O., 529 F.2d at 1092-93 (dissenting opin-
ion). The Board has also concluded that a claimant need not actually be engaged in
loading or unloading a vessel to be performing "longshoring operations" and hence
qualify as an employee under the Act . . See, r,g., Coppolino v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 1 BRBS 205 (1974).
Although this comment will arrive at a statement of coverage similar to that
adopted by the Board, the Board decisions will be neither discussed nor relied upon as
authority since the Board's decisions have been criticized for their individualized, un-
supported, and conclusory treatment of the coverage question. See, e.g., Pittston
Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 47 (2d Cir. 1976). See also, Sea-Land
Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d 629,
634 (3d Cit. 1976). More importantly, however, the Board's decisions have generally
been afforded little or no deference by the courts. See, e.g., Stockman v. John T. Clark
& Son, inc., 539 F.2d 264, 269-70 (1st Cir. 1976); Pittston, supra, at 48-50; Sea-Land,
supra at 634. But see also, Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 541 (5th
Cir. 1976) (note, however, that the court did not hesitate to apply its own interpretation
of the Act). As Judge Campbell of the First Circuit noted in Stockman, since "the focus is
upon the meaning of the statute, the judgement must be our own, not the Board's," 539 F.2d
at 270.
44 529 F.2d at 1081. Some introduction to the relevant waterfront terminology is
necessary before presenting the facts in I.T.O. A "container" is a rectangular metal
structure six to eight feet square by twenty to forty feet in length which is used to
transport cargo. When unloaded from a ship it can be placed on a chassis and driven
away. See Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 265 n.1 (1st Cir. 1976).
For a discussion of the containerization process, see text at note 90 infra. The "stuffing"
process consists of loading a cargo container with individual pieces of cargo. See
529 F.2d at 1082. The "stripping" process is the unloading and sorting out of the cargo
stuffed inside a container, which is often destined for more than one consignee. Id. A
"hustler" is a vehicle used to transport cargo and containers about the waterfront area.
Id.
In I.T.O., William Adkins was a forklift operator at a marine terminal in Balti-
more who was injured while moving a load of brass tubing from its temporary storage
place in a transit shed to a waiting delivery truck. The tubing, having arrived at the
terminal stuffed inside a container seven days earlier, had been stripped from the con-
tainer and stored in the shed until the delivery truck arrived four days later. Id. Donald
Brown, a forklift operator at a marine terminal in Norfolk, Virginia, suffered carbon
monoxide poisoning from fork lift exhaust fumes while in the process of stuffing a
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A divided panel of the court reversed each of the awards, 45
holding that none of the claimants was an "employee" within the
meaning of the Act.''" The court concluded that the status element of
coverage was limited by the concept of "maritime employment," and
that not every person engaged in handling cargo between the ship
and the point of discharge to the consignee (and conversely, between
the point of receipt from the forwarder and the ship) is engaged in
maritime employment. 47 Although the case law on the subject was
viewed as establishing that maritime employment is the loading and
unloading of ships, 48 the court concluded that the terms "maritime
employment," "longshoreman," and "longshoring operations" were
not such words of art that it could decide the case without resort to
the legislative history.'" Turning to the committee reports as the most
informative source on just how far coverage had been extended, the
majority concluded that Congress had not intended to cover persons
who were not engaged in loading or unloading a vesse1.50 Moreover,
the majority viewed the 1972 change in coverage as primarily a re-
sponse to Nacirema," intended merely to remove the previous in-
equities which had resulted when a person otherwise engaged in
maritime employment was injured on land." Consequently, the court
concluded that coverage had not been extended to all persons en-
gaged in the overall process of loading and unloading." Rather, the
majority held that the amendments had extended coverage "only to
those employees engaged in loading and unloading activities between
the ship and the first (last) point of rest, ... . 54
In dissent, Judge Craven rejected the majority's construction of
the status requirement, criticizing both its reliance on the committee
container. Id. Vernie Lee Harris, a hustler operator at the same marine terminal in
Norfolk was injured when the brakes on his hustler failed on the return trip from de-
positing a stuffed container at the container marshalling area adjacent to the pier. Un-
able to stop the hustler, he collided with a container. Id. But see also discussion at note
175, infra.
529 F.2d at 1081.
"Id. at 1088.
"Id. at 1081.
"Id. at 1084, citing Atlantic Trans. Co. v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52, 61 (1914), and
Intercontinental Container Trans. Corp. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 426 F.2d 884,
886 (2d Cir. 1970).
49 529 F.2d at 1084-85.
"Id. at 1087.
5 Id. at 1086. For a discussion of the factual situation in Nacirema see text at note
17 supra.
52 529 F.2d at 1081.
"M. at 1087.
"Id. at 1088. "The term 'point of rest' means a point within a Terminal where
the terminal operator designates that cargo or equipment be placed for movement to or
from a vessel." Id. at 1095 (quoting the Norfolk Marine Terminal Association Tariff
(Item 290) ). See also, the Federal Maritime Commission's definition of the term at 46
C.F.R. § 533.6(c). Hence, under this "point of rest" approach, coverage attaches in the
case of loading between the last storage or holding area on the pier and the ship, and
in the case of unloading between the ship and the first storage or holding area on the
pier.
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reports and its inference of the "point of rest" concept. 55 He found
resort to the legislative history unnecessary, arguing that the generic
term "maritime employment" had an established meaning sufficiently
broad and inclusive to cover the activities of all the claimants. 50 In ad-
dition, Judge Craven concluded that all three claimants had in fact
been involved in the loading and unloading process, and thus
reasoned that all three also qualified as employees under the even
narrower definitional language of "longshoreman" and "longshoring
operations."'" Hence, Judge Craven would have affirmed the awards
on the basis of the plain language of the statute. 5 " With regard to the
majority's inference of the "point of rest," Judge Craven noted that
the concept was nowhere mentioned in either the Act or the legisla-
tive history and concluded that the court had no license to find in a
statute words which Congress had not put there. 5° Finally, Judge Cra-
ven pointed out that application of the point of rest concept would in
effect make a claimant's employee status turn on a second skits test, a
result which would only frustrate the purpose behind the new status
test." He noted:
A worker's "status," i.e., whether he is engaged in maritime
employment, should be determined by the nature of his
work, and not where he performs it. Yet, the "point of rest"
theory, adopted by the majority, means that workers per-
forming the same function, handling the same cargo, will be
treated differently depending upon where they work, even
though they are all working on the premises of a terminal
conceded to be within the Act's definition of "navigable
waters." It was precisely this anomaly, where workers ex-
55 529 F.2d at 1094-95 (dissenting opinion).
56 1d. at 1094. See also text at note 80 infra.
57 529 F.2d at 1097. Judge Craven had noted that the loading and unloading of
ships was "an occupation which is inherent in the work of longshoremen." Id.
"529 F.2d at 1094. In the alternative, judge Craven felt that even if the statu-
tory language was ambiguous, resort to the legislative history was still unnecessary in
light of several available guidelines to statutory construction. He noted that the
LHWCA was remedial legislation which should be liberally construed. Id. at 1091.
Accord, Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 275 n.9 (1st Cir. 1976);
Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 51 (2d Cir. 1976); Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 541 (5th Cir. 1976). Judge Craven also pointed
to a statutory presumption, 33 U.S.C. 920 (a), that a claim comes within the Act's
coverage. 529 F.2d at 1091. This argument has not been as favorably received. See, e.g.,
Stockman, supra at 269; Pittston, supra, at 48. But see also, Jacksonville, supra, at 541. Fi-
nally, Judge Craven argued that the court had only a limited scope of review and that it
should defer to the findings of the Board as the contemporaneous construction of a
statute by the agency charged with its enforcement. 529 F.2d at 1091-93. Again, the
applicability of these guidelines has not been widely accepted. See, e.g., Stockman, supra,
at 269-70; Pittston, supra, at 48-50; Sea-Land Service, Inc, v. Director, Office of
Worker's Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d 629, 634 (3d Cir. 1976). But see also, Jack-
sonville, supra, at 541.
5° 529 F.2d at 1096.
6° Id. at 1096-97.
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posed to identical risks receive disparate workmen's com-
pensation benefits, which provided the impetus for the
1972 Amendments. 6 '
Hence, Judge Craven rejected the point of rest concept as being in-
compatible with the status orientation of the amended Act."
Citing the importance and novelty of the questions presented,
the Fourth Circuit reheard I.T.O. en banc." The en banc court con-
sisted of six judges." Three judges adhered to the point of rest
theory as articulated in the first opinion. 65 Two judges adhered to the
broader, plain language construction of the Act set forth in Judge
Craven's original dissent." Judge Widener, not having been part of
the panel decision, constituted the swing vote on the en banc court. Al-
though subscribing to the basic principle that Congress had intended
coverage to attach only up to the point of rest, he concluded that the
proper test for determining the location of that point is "whether an
otherwise eligible employee is injured while engaged in loading or un-
loading a ship; coverage would not extend to activities for transship-
ment of goods removed from a ship or goods destined for a ship."'"
By a vote of 4-2 the court reversed the Board's award to a claimant
injured while moving previously stripped" brass tubing from its tem-
porary storage place in a warehouse to a waiting delivery truck."
Judge Widener concluded that since the brass tubing had been stripped
from its container" and stored in the transit shed the claimant was
not in the process of unloading a ship but rather in the process of
loading a delivery truck, and thus not covered because he was merely
handling goods for transshipment." The Board's awards to a stutter"
and a hustler" operator, on the other hand, were affirmed by an
evenly divided court," Judge Widener concluding both that stuffing a
container is part of the loading process, and that in operating a hus-
tler between the stuffing area and the container marshalling area the
claimant had been moving goods solely for loading purposes and not
for mere convenience."
" Id.
62 !d.
63 I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Board, 542 F.2d 903 (4th Cir., 1976).
Id. at 905.
65 Id.
6° Id.
" id. It is somewhat unclear exactly what the language "an otherwise eligible em-
ployee" means. That the language simply refers to a claimant who fulfills the situs re-
quirement is questionable since fulfilling the situs test has no bearing on a claimant's
status as an "employee."
"See note 44, supra.
69 542 F.2d at 905.
7° See note 44, supra.
7 ' 542 F.2d at 905.
42 See note 44, supra.
73 Id.
74 542 F.2d at 905.
75 Id.
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In dissent, Judge Butzner adopted the reasoning of Judge
Craven's dissent in the panel opinion." As for Judge Widener's
coverage of stuffers and strippers, Judge Butzner noted that although
that construction alleviated some of the harshness of the point of rest
theory, it also made a rational and uniform application of that theory
even more difficult by adding the factor of lapse of time to the vague
concept of place in determining the location of the point of rest."'
The disagreement in I.T.O. over whether the statutory language
was ambiguous, and thus whether resort to the legislative history was
necessary, illustrates the threshold problem encountered in attempting
to determine the coverage of the Act. Quite simply, the shoreside
coverage which seems appropriate from the plain language of the Act
is dramatically greater than that which its accompanying committee
reports seem to dictate. The language of the Act itself clearly suggests
a broad range of covered activity: coverage is extended not only to
any person engaged in "longshoring operations," but also to "any
harborworker" and "any longshoreman."" Consequently, the Act on
its face implies that a longshoreman is covered even while not en-
gaged in traditional longshoring activity.'" More importantly, how-
ever, coverage is extended to any person engaged in "maritime
employment."" Congress appears to have used that term generically
to indicate a broad range of covered activity of which the work of
longshoremen, harborworkers, ship repairmen, and shipbuilders are
merely lesser included examples."' Hence, as one commentator has
argued, the statutory language by itself can be read as an attempt to
cover all persons who suffer employment-related injuries within the
situs area."
The committee reports, on the other hand, indicate a considera-
bly less extensive range of covered activity. Both the House and the
Senate reports flatly state, "The Committee does not intend to cover
employees who are not engaged in loading, unloading, repairing or
building a vessel ... "H3 Under the committee reports, then, involve-
ment in such activity becomes an essential element in demonstrating
the requisite status under the Act.
"Id. at 910.
"Id.
" LHWCA 2(3), 33 U.S.C. § 902(3) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis supplied).
"See, Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 52 (2d Cir. 1976).
Cf: , Stockman v, John T. Clark & Son, Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 274 (1st Cir. 1976).
"" LHWCA 2(3), 33 U.S.C. 902(3) (Supp. 1976).
81 See, e.g., IA BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY § 16 (7th ed. 1973); Pittston Stevedoring
Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 52 (2d Cir. 1976); 17.0., 529 F.2d at 1090 (dissent-
ing opinion).
RI GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 10, § 6-51 at 429 (2d ed. 1975), The approach
has been severely criticized. See, e.g., Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, Inc., 539 F.2d
269, 274 (1st Cir. 1976); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 56
(2d Cir. 1976).
83 S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. I (1972) & H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4708.
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The clear manner in which the committee reports thus reduce
the arguably broader test of "maritime employment" to the narrower
one of loading, unloading, building, or repairing a vessel makes the
significance of the dispute over whether or not the statutory language
is ambiguous readily apparent. If the term "maritime employment" is
found to have an established meaning, making resort to the legislative
history unnecessary, then a broad extension of coverage based on a
plain language reading of the Act is possible. On the other hand, if
the term is deemed ambiguous, then resort to the legislative history is
necessary and the sweep of shoreside coverage becomes dependent on
the court's view of the loading, unloading, building and repair func-
tions.
To date, the Circuits have been unanimous in referring to the
legislative history to determine what activity is covered under the
Act." Hence the scope of "maritime employment" has been construed
only within the limiting context of the reports. Thus it should be
noted that a court bent upon a liberal construction of the amend-
ments could structure an extensive sweep of shoreside coverage sim-
ply by adopting a plain language reading of the statute and conclud-
ing that resort to the legislative history was unnecessary. Construing
the Act with reference to the committee reports, however, the I.T.O.
majority concluded that coverage had been extended shoreside only a
few feet from the pier so as to cover those persons engaged in loading
and unloading functions up to the "point of rest." But as Judge Cra-
ven noted, the applicability of that concept is severely undercut by the
fact that it is nowhere mentioned in either the Act or the committee
reports. Moreover, judicial inference of the "point of rest" is not only
unfounded but inappropriate as well, for that technical concept is in-
consistent with both the modern case law treating the scope of the
loading and unloading operations and current operational practices in
the longshoring industry.
While case law is of extremely limited assistance in delineating
how far shoreward the maritime nature of loading and unloading
extends,85 it is sufficient to underscore the unacceptability of defining
the landward limit of that process by means of the "point of rest." Al-
" See, e.g., Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 273 (1st Cir.
1976); Pittston Stevedoring Corp. v. Dellaventura, 544 F.2d 35, 51 (2d Cir. 1976); Sea-
Land Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d
629, 637 (3d Cir. 1976); I.T.O. Corp. v. Benefits Review Board, 529 F.2d 1080,
1084-85 (4th Cir. 1975); Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 539.40
(5th Cir. 1976); Weyerhauser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957, 960 (9th Cir. 1975).
" Prior to the amendments, the case law on the subject of loading and unloading
had been developed solely in the confining context of unseaworthiness actions. Since
the gangplank was the presumptive boundary of admiralty jurisdiction, an unseawor-
thiness recovery for a shoreside injury was allowed only where it was an appurtenance
of the ship which had caused the injury. See, e.g., Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S.
202, 214 n.14 (1971). Hence, as the Supreme Court noted in Law, the attempt to define
the loading process had only resulted in "substantial confusion." Id.
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though the minority view would define the loading process in a nar-
row and mechanical fashion, limiting it to those activities which begin
with the physical act of lifting the cargo onto the vessel," the more
prevalent view defines the terms "loading" and "unloading" in a
pragmatic and less ritualistic sense." This pragmatic approach consid-
ers as within the scope of loading activity those functions which are
direct and necessary steps in the process of transferring cargo to or
from a ship.88 As Judge Craven recognized,"" the weight of authority
thus defines loading and unloading in a functional and realistic man-
ner which clearly includes workers who are landward of the first (last)
point of rest. Consequently, while the cases fail to describe how far
shoreward the maritime nature of the loading and unloading process
extends, they do at least. reject the limited view of that process rep-
resented by the hypertechnical concept of the point of rest.
In addition, application of the point of rest is totally at odds with
current operational practices on the waterfront. To determine a
claimant's employee status on the basis of whether he was injured on
the landward or seaward side of the point of rest is thoroughly incom-
patible with the practice of containerization, the standard method of
transporting cargo in the longshoring industry today. Containerization
is a method of cargo transportation developed during World War II
in which a ship's bulk cargo is compartmentalized within cargo
containers."" Cargo can be stuffed in these containers for loading
aboard a ship before the ship is even berthed, and can likewise be
stripped from the containers after the ship has left. Since the time
consuming work of stowage and unstowage can be performed on land
in the vessel's absence, the ship's "turn-around time," or time in port,
is drastically reduced. In effect, the container is thus a modern substi-
tute For the hold of a vessel," allowing longshoremen who formerly
worked within the ship's hold to perform the same work ashore in-
stead. Yet, since these cargo containers are customarily loaded and
unloaded at a point landward of the container's first (last) point of
rest, application of that concept, would preclude coverage of
longshoremen engaged in stuffing and stripping activities—the very
heart of the loading and unloading process. That Congress intended
'1 ° Law v. Victory Carriers, inc., 432 F.2d 376, 380 (1970), rev'd on other grounds,
Victory Carriers, Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971).
'T Id. at 383.
"See, e.g., Garrett v. Gutzeit, 491 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1974); Law v. Victory Car-
riers, Inc., 432 F.2d 376 (5th Cir. 1970), rev'd on other grounds, Victory Carriers, Inc. v.
Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971); Gebhard v. S.S. Hawaiian Legislator, 425 F.2d 1303 (9th Cir.
1970); Hagans v. Ellerman & Bucknall Steamship Co., 318 F.2d 563 (3d Cir. 1963);
Olvera v. Michalos, 307 F. Supp. 9 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Litwinowicz v. Weyerhauser S.S.
Co., 179 F. Supp. 812 (W.D. Pa. 1959).
"	 529 F.2d at 1097-1101 (dissenting opinion), See also, the cases cited in
note 88 supra,
"See note 44, supra.
91 As the Second Circuit has noted, the container is "functionally a part of the
ship." Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynz, 45l F.2d 800, 815 (2d Cir. 1971)
(Friendly, J.).
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such a result is highly unlikely, especially in view of the committee re-
ports' explicit recognition of the fact that the advent of containeriza-
tion has resulted in more of the longshoreman's work being per-
formed on land than ever before. 92
Finally, inference of the "point of rest" concept is inconsistent
with the amended Act itself. Amended section 5(a) of the Act was in-
tended to eliminate both the longshoreman's unseaworthiness remedy
and the vessel owner's indemnity action against the
stevedore-employer23 by making the LHWCA the exclusive remedy
for all workers covered under the Act." But if longshoremen injured
landward of the "point of rest" are not employees covered under the
Act, then it would seem that they are not precluded from maintaining
an unseaworthiness action against the vessel, and it would also seem
that the shipowner is not precluded from maintaining an indemnity
action against the stevedore. Hence, it might be that inference of the
"point of rest" could serve to provoke the expensive tripartite litiga-
tion which the amendments were designed to prevent. It can hardly
be presumed that Congress intended the shoreside sweep of coverage
under the Act to be so strictly limited as to effectively negate the far
more important purpose underlying section 5(a).
Thus, while I.T.O. serves as a good illustration of the scope of
the coverage problem, its point of rest rationale is an entirely unrealis-
tic solution to the controversy. A more reasonable construction of the
Act's coverage is that provided by Judge Friendly in Pittston Stevedor-
ing Corp. v. Dellaventura. 65 In Pittston, the Second Circuit considered
the status of two claimants injured on the Brooklyn waterfront." Both
were in the process of handling cargo which had been unloaded from
9: S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1972)	 H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 4698, 4707-08.
93 See note 29 supra.
" 33 U.S.C. § 905(a) (Supp. 1976).
95 544 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1976).
96 Although there were four cases consolidated on appeal in Pittston, the court
considered the merits of the coverage issue in only two of them. One of the employers'
petitions to review the Board's award was dismissed as untimely, Pittston 544 F.2d at
42-44, 57, and another was dismissed as having been mooted by the insurance carrier's
payment of the award, id. at 44-46, 57.
Again, presentation of the facts of the case requires an introduction to the rele-
vant waterfront terminology. Goods for more than one consignee are often shipped in a
single container. A "checker" checks the goods being stuffed into or stripped from a
container against the bill or lading. See Pittston, 544 F.2d at 41 n.4. A "shape-up" em-
ployee is a person hired from the union hiring hall, usually for only a day at a time. Id.
at 42.
In Pittston, Carmelo Blundo was a checker at the 19th Street pier in Brooklyn
who sustained injuries to his head and lower back when he slipped on some ice while
checking cargo being stripped from a container. The container had been unloaded at a
different pier a few days before and carried by truck to the 19th Street pier. Id. at
41. Ralph Caputo was a shape-up employee who was injured while inside a consignee's
truck helping the driver load boxes of cheese which had been discharged from a vessel
at least five days previously. Id. at 42.
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the vessel a few days before." The court affirmed each award by a
vote of 2-1."a
Concluding that the status problem in these cases arose from
Congress' failure to define the operative terms found in the definition
of "employee," 9" the Pittston court turned to the legislative history for
clarification.'" Significantly, however, the Second Circuit adopted a
markedly different view of the basic purpose behind the amendments
than that taken by the Fourth Circuit in I.T.O.. While the LEO. court
had viewed the extended coverage as merely a direct response to the
Nacirema invitation,'"' the Second Circuit viewed shoreside coverage
as part of the quid pro quo which maritime workers had received in ex-
change for releasing their right to maintain an unseaworthiness action
against the vessel.'"" Consequently, although both circuits made the
language of the committee reports determinative of the issue, they
reached dramatically different conclusions as to the intended
shoreside reach of the amendments due to their differing perceptions
of the basic purpose behind that extended coverage.
The Pittston majority had little difficulty in rejecting the point of
rest approach.'"" Observing that persons engaged in loading or un-
loading between the point of rest and the ship were engaged in
"longshoring operations," Judge Friendly reasoned that to limit. cover-
age to persons engaged in just that activity would be to ignore the rest
of the language found in the Act." 14 As judge Friendly noted,
"maritime employment" was used in the Act in a manner which
clearly established it as a term which is broader than "longshoring
operations."'" 5 He also noted that Congress had provided coverage
for "any longshoreman" and not just for those persons engaged in
longshoring operations.'" Thus the court reasoned that a longshore-
man could be covered under the Act even while he was not engaged
in traditional longshoring activity.'" Yet while concluding that the
97 544 F.2d at 41, 42.
"Id. at 57.
"Id. at 41.
' 00 1d. at 51.
101 529 F.2d at 1086.
I" 544 F.2d at 40. It should he noted that the two courts looked to different re-
ports. The Fourth Circuit looked to the House Report. which does not mention
shoreside coverage as a basic purpose behind the amendments. 529 F.2d at 1086. The
Second Circuit, however, looked to the Senate Report, 544 F.2d at 40, which stales that
the primary purpose behind the amendments was "to upgrade benefits, extend coverage
to additional workers, provide a specified cause of action for damages against third per-
sons and to promulgate administrative reforms." S. REP. No. 1125, 92d Cong., 2d Sess,
4-5 (1972) (emphasis added).
"3 judge Lombard endorsed the "point of rest" concept in dissent, however, ar-
guing that it was both more in keeping with the realities of maritime employment and
Far easier to apply. 544 F.2d at 57.
"4 1d. at 52.
'" Id.
' 06 1d.
'" Id.
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statutory language was sufficient to condemn inference of the point of
rest concept, the Pittston majority further concluded that the Act itself
did not adequately describe the intended extent of shoreside
coverage.'" Thus, it found that an examination of the Act's legislative
history was necessary.
Turning to the committee reports the court came to two conclu-
sions. First, the court concluded that Congress had extended coverage
to shoreside areas because it realized that with the increasing use of
modern cargo-handling techniques such as containerization, a much
greater percentage of a longshoreman's work is now being performed
on land.'" Reasoning that stuffing a container is part of the loading
process and that stripping a container is the functional equivalent of
sorting discharged cargo, the court concluded that persons engaged in
either stuffing or stripping operations satisfied the status requirement
of the Act."° Thus the court ruled that a claimant injured while
checking'" the cargo being stripped from a container was covered by
virtue of his direct involvement in a stripping operation. 12 The fact
that the claimant was injured at a pier other than the exact pier at
which the container had first been unloaded was deemed irrelevant:
since the cargo had not yet been delivered to the consignee, the un-
loading process still had not been completed.'"
The second conclusion drawn from the committee reports was
that Congress had attempted to minimize those occasions in which
employees moved in and out of the Act's coverage during the course
of a day's work by providing for uniform coverage of all those per-
sons engaged in loading or unloading functions on the pier." 4 The
court further determined that Congress' concern for uniformity had
not been limited merely to the Nacirema situation, but rather that it
had extended to the unequitable situation resulting where one pier-
based longshoreman was deemed covered while another pier-based
longshoreman situated further from the water's edge was not.'" Thus
the Pittston court concluded that the committee's language was broad
enough to cover " a person ... who spent a significant part of his
time in working on vessels""° so long as he did not fall within either of
the two explicit descriptions of excluded persons contained in the
reports" 7 —"employees who are not engaged in loading, unloading
" and "employees whose responsibility is only to pick up stored
1 " Id.
Id. at 53.
10 1d.
"' See note 96 supra.
'"/d. The reports specifically provide for coverage of a checker who is "directly
involved" in a loading or unloading operation. H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4708.
13 544 F.2d at 53.
"' Id. at 54.
" 5 1d.
" 6 1d.
'" Id.
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cargo for further trans-shipment.""d The court found with regard to
a "shape-up"'" employee injured while loading cheese into a
consignee's truck that his responsibility was not only to pick up stored
cargo for further trans-shipment.'" Although viewed as a closer ques-
tion, the court also found that in loading the cheese into the
consignee's truck the claimant had in fact been engaged in the process
of unloading a ship."' Noting that he clearly would have been "un-
loading" if his injury had occurred while he was moving the cheese
from a position on the pier to the consignee's truck, the court con-
cluded that it would be "wholly artificial" to find that the claimant had
not been unloading simply because his injury had occurred while he
was inside the consignee's truck.'"
Formulating a coverage test which will no doubt generate con-
siderable controversy the court held: "[The Amendments at least
cover all persons meeting the situs requirements (I) who are engaged
in stuffing or stripping containers or (2) are engaged in the handling
of cargo up to the point where the consignee has actually begun its
movement from the pier (or in the case of loading, from the time
when the consignee has stopped his vehicle at the pier), provided in
the latter instances that the employee has spent a significant part of
his time in the typical longshoring activity of taking cargo on or off a
vessel."'"
The Second Circuit's approach to the question of what consti-
tutes covered activity is thus a bifurcated one, establishing one status
standard for stuffers and strippers and a separate standard for all
other workers engaged in the maritime handling of cargo. Sniffers
and strippers are considered "employees" without further inquiry.
"Cargo-handlers," on the other hand, must show that a significant
part of their time has been spent in "the typical longshoring activity of
taking cargo on or off a vessel."
The primary significance of Judge Friendly's opinion in Pittston
lies in its conclusion that the extent of shoreside coverage under the
Act is not simply dependent upon but is actually co-extensive with the
landward sweep of the loading and unloading process. Unlike the
""1-1. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [19721 U.S. CODE CoNG. &
AD. NEWS 4698, 4708.
" 9 See note 96 supra.
12° 544 F.2d at 54. The court noted that the claimant performed a variety of jobs
on the pier, including going on vessels. Id. More important, the court did not consider
the cargo "stored" within the committee's meaning merely because the consignee had
delayed five days in picking it up. Id, The court specifically did not decide whether
cargo should ever be regarded as "stored" so long as it remained in the custody of the
stevedore rather than being placed in a public warehouse. Id. at 54 n.24. The court
noted that one of the cases which it had dismissed, where there was a delay of 133 days,
might have demanded such a decision. Id. For a further discussion of that type of situa-
tion see note 158 infra.
121 Id. at 54-55.
"'Id. at 54.
"2 Id. at 56.
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J.T.O. majority, the Pittston court concluded that the amendments
were intended to cover the entire loading and unloading process, and
not merely a portion of that process.' 24 When the entire process is
deemed covered, the crucial question becomes what types of shoreside
cargo-handling activity can be considered part of loading or unload-
ing a ship. The conclusion that stuffers and strippers are engaged in
loading and unloading seems logically inescapable. 12" Much more sig-
nificant is the court's conclusion that a longshoreman moving cargo
inside the consignee's truck was in fact engaged in unloading a ship.
For the court thus concluded that the loading and unloading func-
tions, and consequently the type of cargo-handling activity covered
under the Act, extended "up to the point where the consignee has ac-
tually begun its movement from the pier (or in the case of loading,
from the time when the consignee has stopped his vehicle at the
pier)." 12 " Selection of that limit makes eminent good sense. In contrast
to the Fourth Circuit's "point of rest," which has only a geographic
significance,'" the point at which the consignee relinquishes or as-
sumes control of the cargo has a functional significance as well, mark-
ing the most obvious point at which cargo enters or leaves maritime
commerce. 12 8
While the Pittston court's definition of the landward extent of the
loading and unloading process is logically compelling, its analysis fal-
ters when it requires a cargo-handler to have "spent a significant part
of his time in the typical longshoring activity of taking cargo on or off
a vessel" in order to satisfy the status test. This proviso treatment of
cargo-handlers raises serious questions not only as to its intended
meaning, but more importantly, as to it's necessity.' 29 First, the nature
of this additional showing required of cargo-handlers is somewhat un-
clear. Two interpretations seem plausible. The proviso could be in-
'" Whereas the Fourth Circuit had concluded that only a portion of the loading
and unloading process was covered, 1.T.O., 529 F.2d at 1087, the Second Circuit con-
strued the Act as covering Caputo so long as he was not an employee who was "not en-
gaged in loading or unloading a vessel." Pittston, 544 F.2d at 54. The proviso aside,
then, the Pittston court viewed the entire loading and unloading process as covered ac-
tivity.
'" See text at note 90 supra For a discussion of the containerization process. The
Pittston court's coverage of stuffers and strippers was later followed by the First Circuit
in Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 276-77 (1st Cir. 1976).
Ise 544 F.2d at 56.
'" See Judge Craven's criticism of the "point of rest," I.T.O., 529 F.2d at 1095. It
should also be noted that even the geographic significance of a "point of rest" lends no
real meaning, stability, or predictability to the application of that concept. For as Judge
Craven noted, the location of the "point of rest will vary from port to port depending
upon the sophistication of each port's cargo-handling facilities, and may well vary from
day to day in the same port depending on the whim of the terminal operator. Id. at
1096.
128 See Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation
Programs, 540 F.2d 629, 638 (3d Cir. 1976): Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539
F.2d 533, 543-44 (5th Cir. 1976).
I" judge Friendly himself posed this question in Pittston. 544 F.2d at 56.
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terpreted to require merely that a significant part of the claimant's
time be spent in the loading and unloading process as realistically
construed. The court's use of the language "typical longshoring
activity"' 3 ° and its recognition of land-based activity as a new fact of
life on the waterfront,"' coupled with the acknowledgeinent that its
holding had gone some way toward reading the status requirement
out of the Act"z would support such a construction. Interpreted in
this manner, the proviso would mean that a longshoreman injured
while handling cargo between the ship and the consignee's truck is
covered under the Act as long as he has spent a significant part of his
time in just such activity, the loading and unloading process. It ap-
pears, however, that a stricter showing was intended. The language
"taking cargo on or off a vessel" 33 seems to require that a cargo-
handler actually spend a significant part of his time going on board a
ship. This more demanding interpretation of the proviso is supported
by the Pittston court's repeated mention that the cargo-handler in that
case did in fact work "on" vessels.'" The First Circuit endorsed this
narrow "shipboard activity" 135 reading of the proviso by way of dic-
tum in Stockman v. John T. Clark & Son, Inc.,'" interpreting it to re-
quire of some claimants that they actually "go aboard a ship" a sig-
nificant part of the time.'" Yet to require periodic presence on board
a ship is simply unreasonable in light of Congress' explicit recognition
that containerization has resulted in a much greater percentage of a
longshoreman's work being performed on land.' 38 Moreover, to re-
quire actual shipboard activity of any claimant contradicts the fact, as
recognized by the First Circuit itself, that "even longshoring work in
its traditional form is at times organized so that some workers remain
at all times on the pier as part of a continuous loading or unloading
process."'"
While the question of the proviso's intended meaning is of obvi-
ous importance within the Second Circuit, the more crucial question
as regards the future development of the law is that posed by Judge
"3" 544 F.2d at 56.
' 3 ' Id. at 53.
"QId. at 56.
"3 Id. (emphasis added).
"4 Id. at 54.
'" Stockman V. John T. Clark & Son, Inc., 539 F.2d 264, 277 (1st Cir. 1976).
' 36 539 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1976),
"7 See id. at 276-77. The court did note, however, that it did not believe that
Congress had intended to exclude bona fide members of a class of employees whose
members would have been covered some of the time under the earlier Act. Hence the
Court did not find that the Act required a demonstration by each claimant that he indi-
vidually would have been covered. The court determined that it was those who were
not plainly includible in some recognized category or maritime employment who might
have to demonstrate their entitlement to coverage by showing that their duties encom-
passed shipboard activity. Id.
"8 H.R. REP. No, 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972) U.S. CODE CONC..
& An NEWS 4698, 4707-08,
"' Stockman, 539 F.2d at 277. See also, I.T.O., 529 F.2d at 1088.
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Friendly; namely, "whether the proviso is essential"'" in determining
the employee status of injured cargo-handlers. It is submitted that re-
gardless of which interpretation is adopted, the proviso itself is
neither an essential nor a proper consideration in determining the
employee status of a claimant who is injured while handling cargo
which is in maritime commerce.
Application of the proviso requirement that a cargo-handler
have spent a significant part of his time in the typical longshoring ac-
tivity of taking cargo on or off a vessel seems certain to defeat the
basic goal of a uniform compensation system for those engaged in
maritime employment. In fact, the illogical coverage scheme which the
proviso will produce can hardly be called a system at all. A system of
coverage should bear a logical relation to the actual operation of the
process it is designed to cover. Hence, under a truly uniform compen-
sation system, cargo which is in maritime commerce and on its way to
a ship should not pass from a handler protected by the Act to one
who is not protected by the Act. Yet, that is exactly what can happen
when the proviso is applied. For example, under the Pittston formula,
a stuffer injured while stuffing a container one thousand feet from
the water's edge automatically satisfies the status test. However, a hus-
tler operator who is injured while depositing that same container at a
container marshalling area within fifty feet of the ship fulfills the
status requirement only if he satisfies the proviso. Thus, despite the
fact that the hustler operator performs a later function in the overall
loading process, he is forced to make a stronger showing of status in
order to be covered under the Act. This is clearly illogical. It simply
cannot be maintained either that the hustler operator is not engaged
in loading a vessel or that he is performing any less essential a func-
tion in the overall loading process than that performed by the stuffer.
The hustler operator's status as an employee, therefore, should not be
made to depend upon the nature of his past activity.
In addition, the proviso seems destined to produce fortuitous re-
suits among those performing similar functions in the loading or un-
loading process. For example, if two hustler operators collided with
each other while carrying containers which they had picked up at the
same stuffing point and which were destined for the same ship, one
might be covered while the other might not since, under the proviso
approach, each cargo-handler's coverage would depend on whether a
significant part of his time had been spent in the traditional longshor-
ing activity of taking cargo on or off a vessel. Thus, depending upon
the nature of their past activity, some cargo-handlers will be covered
while others will not—despite the fact that they may be injured in the
same way, at the same place, while performing the same task. Yet as
Judge Craven noted in his I.T.O. dissent, the anomaly which the
amendments were designed to correct was the situation "where work-
ers exposed to identical risks receive disparate workmen's compensa-
' 40 Pittston, 544 F.2d at 56.
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don benefits."141 To look to past activity in order to determine the
employee status of claimants injured while handling cargo in maritime
commerce would frustrate the basic goal of uniform coverage. It
would promote both illogical differences in coverage among persons
performing successive functions in the loading or unloading of a ship,
and fortuitous differences in coverage among persons performing
similar functions in the loading or unloading process.
Finally, the proviso represents an unwarranted judicial imposi-
tion of a condition to recovery. It has been suggested that the reason
for requiring cargo-handlers to demonstrate their entitlement to
coverage by fulfilling the proviso is that unlike stuffers and strippers
they are not plainly includible within some "recognized category of
maritime employment."'" That explanation however is unconvincing.
Not only is there considerable controversy as to what is a "recognized
category" of maritime employment, but moreover it seems clear that
in applying the statutory language the proper inquiry should be
whether or not cargo-handlers fall within a category recognized by the.
Act. Significantly, the Act itself does not specify different degrees of
covered activity; rather, both the Act and the legislative history mark
as employees those persons engaged in loading and unloading. 143 For
example, in Pittston, the court found that the claimant who was in-
jured while moving cheese inside the consignee's truck was engaged in
unloading a ship.' 44 That alone is sufficient to establish him as an
employee under the Act. By inquiring into the nature of a claimant's
past activity, the proviso demands a more stringent showing of status
than that called for either by the Act or by the committee reports.
Thus, while the Pittston court's conclusion as to the landward
sweep of the loading and unloading process seems correct, its proviso
treatment of cargo-handlers is unpersuasive. A better approach would
simply dispense with the proviso altogether, as was done in the most
recent appellate construction of the status requirement, Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue. 145
In Jacksonville, the Fifth Circuit considered five cases consoli-
dated on appeal, two of which involved the employee status of
cargo-handlers.'" Both claimants were injured while handling cargo
'" 529 F.2d at 1097.
142 The rationale is that of the First Circuit by way of dictum in Stockman, 539
F.2d at 277. The Pittston court did not specify why it had attached the proviso. Rather,
the court not only specifically left open the question of its necessity, but was careful to
note that the amendments "at least" covered those who satisfied the proviso. Pittston,
544 F.2d at 56.
143 Even the Pittston court recognized this fact. 544 F.2d at 54. See also,
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. v. Perdue, 539 F.2d 533, 539-40 (5th Cir. 1976); Sea-Land
Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d 629,
638 (3d Cir. 1976).
'" 544 F.2d at 54.
142 539 F.2d 533 (5th Cir. 1976).
"°See 539 F.2d at 543-44. The court did not employ the term "cargo-handler,"
but the claimants in Jacksonville fall within the Pittston definition of that term and will
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which either was bound for shipping, or had previously been removed
from a vessel. A unanimous court affirmed each of the awards. 147
The Jacksonville court rejected the "point of rest" theory,'" not-
ing the individual injustices which application of that concept would
produce."9 The court considered application of that principle to be
inconsistent with the liberal construction which should be afforded
remedial legislation such as the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's
Compensation Act. 150 The court also rejected the proposition that a
claimant's job classification, such as "longshoreman" or "ship repair-
man," or the official name of his union should have any bearing on
the determination of his status as an employee.'S 1 Turning to the
legislative history for further assistance, the court concluded that the
amendments had extended coverage not only to those actually en-
gaged in loading, unloading, building or repairing a vessel, but also to
those "directly involved" in such work.'" Consequently, the court
concluded that both claimants satisfied the status test since they were
performing functions which constituted an integral part of the process
of moving maritime cargo from a ship to a land mode of
tra nsportation.' 53
The Jacksonville decision is thus significant in two respects. First,
the Fifth Circuit's decision represents the most explicit statement to
date of the type of shoreside cargo handling activities which are en-
compassed within the loading and unloading functions. In concluding,
be referred to here as such. In Jacksonville, Diversion Ford was a member of a
"warehouseman's" union in the port of Beaumont, Texas who was injured while secur-
ing a military vehicle to a railway flat car for transportation inland. The vehicle had
been unloaded off a vessel either two or seventeen days earlier and placed in a storage
area. From there it had been lifted onto the flat car on the day before the accident. Id.
at 543, Will Bryant was a "cotton header" in Galveston who was injured while unload-
ing bales of cotton from dray wagons and stacking them in pier warehouses. The
wagons would bring the cotton up to the pier from shoreside warehouses where it had
been deposited by inland shippers. After Bryant's "cotton-headers" union had finished
stacking the cotton in the pier warehouses it would remain there for anywhere from
one day to several weeks until the "longshoremen's" union took it on board a ship. The
cotton which Bryant was handling when hurt remained in the warehouse for five days
until the longshoremen arrived. Id. at 544.
17 Id. at 547.
"'Id. at 540.
142 Apparently adopting a Widener-like construction of the point of rest theory,
the court reasoned that under that theory both Ford and Bryant would have been cov-
ered if their handling of the 'military vehicle and the cotton, respectively, had been
part of a continuous operation. 539 F.2d at 543-44. The court further noted, however,
that application of the point of rest theory would deny coverage solely because of the
brief discontinuity in time created by the temporary storage of the vehicle and the cot-
ton, despite the fact that the brief delay had not altered the essential nature of either
man's work. Id. Consequently the court refused to adopt the point of rest theory, not-
ing that it could not overlook the individual injustices which it would create. Id. at 543.
L" 539 F.2d at 540 n.20, 21.
"t 539 F.2d at 539. Accord, Stockman, 539 F.2d at 272; Pittston, 544 F.2d at 52.
But see also, Weyerhauser Co. v. Gilmore, 528 F.2d 957. 962 (9th Cir. 1975).
152 539 F.2d at 539-40.
'" Id. at 543-44.
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as the Pittston court had, that the entire loading and unloading pro-
cess was covered under the Act, the Jacksonville court clearly viewed
that process as extending landward to the point at which cargo enters
and leaves maritime commerce.'" Hence, loading and unloading ac-
tivity was seen as the handling of maritime cargo, and the individual
claimants were covered because they were performing an integral
function in the movement of maritime cargo. 155
Perhaps the Jacksonville court's most significant contribution to
the developing law on the status requirement, however, is the uniform-
ity with which it applied its coverage scheme. Once the court found
a claimant to be performing covered activity, it considered the status
' 54 Not only did the court conclude that Ford was involved in unloading a ship
because he was performing an integral part of the process of moving maritime cargo
from a ship to land transportation, but it expressly noted that Ford was performing "the
last step in transferring this cargo from sea to land transportation." 539 F.2d at 543
(emphasis added).
' 65 It is noteworthy that the Jacksonville court concluded that a claimant need
only be "directly involved" in loading or unloading a ship to satisfy the status test, 539
F.2d at 539-40. The court's use of the phrase "directly involved," which is extracted
from the committee reports, represents the only application of that language to persons
who physically handle cargo. When read in the context of the reports, however, the
phrase seems to apply only to those persons who participate in the maritime transfer of
cargo without themselves physically handling that cargo. The reports state:
The Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not engaged
in loading. unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just because they are
injured in an area adjoining navigable waters used for such activity. Thus
employees whose responsibility is only to pick up stored cargo for further
trans-shipment would not be covered, nor would purely clerical employees
whose jobs do nut require them to participate in the loading, or unloading
of cargo. However, checkers, for example, who are directly involved in the
loading or unloading functions are covered by the new amendments.
H.R. REP. No, 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. Cotta Com:. & Au.
NEWS 4698, 4708. In that the language "directly involved in" follows die provision ex-
cluding "purely clerical" employees who do not even "participate" in loading or unload-
ing, and the selection of a checker as an example, it does not appear io be directed at
those who physically handle cargo. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 12, § 6-51 at 430.
Note that the Pittston court employed the term with regard to the checker Blundo, 544
F.2d at 53, but not with regard to the cargo-handler Caputo. Id. at 54.
The objection herein expressed is not meant to imply that there is any significant
or even measurable difference between the standards of "directly involved ill" and "en-
gaged in." The objection is merely that the committee reports do not constitute the
source of a separate "directly involved in" test for cargo-handlers. In this regard it is
significant that, having concluded that a claimant need be merely "directly involved in"
rather than actually "engaged in" loading or unloading, the Jacksonville court did not
bother to determine whether Ford and Bryant were actually "engaged in" loading or
unloading. The importance of whether or not the "directly involved in" standard is a
valid one as applied in Jacksonville is diminished by the fact that both claimants were
clearly engaged in covered activity not only tinder thepicksonville court's "integral pai nt
of the maritime transfer of cargo" test but also under the definition of' the loading and
unloading process adopted by the Second and Third Circuits. See Pittston, 544 F.2d at
54-55, 56; Sea-Land Service, Du:. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Pro- --r-
-
grams, 540 F.2d 629, 638 (3d Cir. 1976). Since each claimant was handling maritime
cargo, it seems likely that if pressed to decide the issue, the Jacksonville court would
have found both claimants "engaged in" and not merely "directly involved in" the load-
ing and unloading process.
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test satisfied without inquiring into the nature of his past activity.
Having marked the landward limit of the loading and unloading pro-
cess, the court found that everyone who had handled cargo up to that
point was an employee. This uniform coverage approach of the
Jacksonville court is to be contrasted with the fortuitous coverage
which is likely to result under the Pittston court's proviso approach. It
is suggested that in light of Congress' stated concern for a uniform
compensation system,' the Jacksonville scheme is the more appro-
priate approach.
In summary, it is submitted that the amendments were intended
to cover the entire loading and unloading functions, and that the
landward sweep of the loading and unloading process should be
found to coincide with the point at which cargo enters and leaves
maritime commerce. 157 Not only stuffers and strippers, but all those
who handle maritime cargo 158 should be considered to be loading or
unloading a vessel and hence engaged in maritime employment. In-
formed discussion of the other types of maritime employment
specified in the Act—ship building, ship repairing and ship
breaking—is made difficult by the relative absence of case law on
those subjects.'" It is submitted, however, that coverage should attach
to any person performing an integral part of those functions as realis-
tically construed.
15 H.R. REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in {1972] U.S. Coot: CONG.
& An. NEWS 4698, 4708.
' 57 The Third Circuit has adopted this view as well. See Sea-Land Service, Inc. v.
Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976). The
Sea-Land court concluded that, "(T)he overall intention appears to be to afford federal
coverage to all those employees engaged in handling cargo after it has been delivered
from another mode of transportation for the purpose of loading it aboard a vessel, and
to all those employees engaged in discharging cargo from a vessel up to the time it has
been delivered to a place where the next mode of transportation will pick it up," Id. at
638. The opinion is not fully discussed in the status section of this comment because
that statement of coverage was arrived at in the context of a rejection of the situs test.
See the text at note 224, infra.
' 55 A potentially troublesome question is that of determining when maritime
cargo loses its maritime status due to the consignee's delay in picking it up. See discus-
sion at note 120 supra. It seems clear that if kept in a public warehouse, the cargo
would lose its maritime status. The real problem will lie in determining the maritime
nature of cargo which is left with a stevedore who neither operates a warehousing ser-
vice nor has contracted to provide storage. Decisions of this sort may well rest upon a
court's subjective reaction to the length of time involved.
'"Jacksonville presents the only case to date in which the status of someone in-
volved in a function other than loading or unloading has been at issue. Of the two em-
ployees involved, the only claimant even arguably performing shipbuilding or ship re-
pair work a'. the time of his injury was John L. Nulty, a carpenter at a shipyard in Moss
Point, Mississippi. Nulty was injured while building a piece of woodwork which was to
be installed by someone else in a new ship that had been launched but not yet commis-
sioned. Although he occasionally went on board to take measurements, must of Nulty's
work was performed in a fabrication shop 300 feet from the ship. The court found that
Nulty was an employee under the Act because he was directly involved in an ongoing
shipbuilding operation. 539 F.2d at 543.44.
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B. Determining Whether or not a Claimant is "Engaged in"
Maritime Employment
An employee is	 any person engaged in maritime
employment".'" Thus, in addition to raising the basic issue of what
activities constitute maritime employment, the definition also raises
the issue of when a claimant is or need be "engaged in" maritime em-
ployment to be considered an employee under the Act. To date, the
courts have been unanimous in looking to the nature of the claimant's
function at the time he was injured in order to determine whether or
not he was engaged in maritime employment.'" It is submitted that
this "at the time of injury" test raises serious questions, however, both
as to the proper method for determining a claimant's function at the
time of injury and, more importantly, as to whether that test itself
represents the legislatively intended meaning of the term "engaged
in".
The threshold problem in defining the nature of the claimant's
function at the time of injury is determining just how long a period of
time should be considered "the time of injury." Focusing too precisely
on the nature of the particular act performed at the exact moment of
injury can lead to a distorted impression of the claimant's overall
function. A good example of such an overly-precise inquiry is that
fashioned by the Third Circuit in Sea-Land Service, Inc. v. Johns." 2
There, Wallace Johns was a "shape-up" 1 " employee hired as a shuttle
driver to haul trailers between Sea-Land's two terminals in Port
Elizabeth, New Jersey. 1 ' 4 On the day in question, Sea-Land was in the
process of moving its operations from an old terminal facility at Berth
52 to its new terminal at Berth 90. 165 Johns began the day by hauling
a trailer which had just come off a ship at Berth 52 to the new termi-
nal at Berth 90 where Sea-Land stored its containers.'" Johns was in-
jured on the return trip from Berth 90 to Berth 52 when his truck
overturned.'" While the record was clear as to the nature of the load
on the initial trip from Berth 52 to Berth 90, it was decidedly equivo-
cal as to the nature of the load on the return trip. 16 " Johns testified
that he thought the crate he was carrying was full and was being
'°° LHWCA § 3(a), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
I " See, e.g., Stockman, 539 F.2d at 266; Pittston, 544 F.2d at 41-42, 53-54; Sea-
Land Service, Inc. v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 540 F.2d
629, 639-40 (3d Cir. 1976); I .T.O., 529 F.2d at 1087-88; Jacksonville, 539 V.2d at 539-40.
Proposed regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Labor also appear to take this
position. See Proposed LHWCA Coverage Regulations, 20 C.F.R. § 710.3(a)(1), 39 Fed.
Reg. 18269 (1974).
1 ° 2 540 F.2d 629 (3d Cir. 1976).
1 ° 3 A "shape-up" employee is one who is hired for the day through the union hir-
ing hall.
'°' 540 F.2d at 632.
"3 Id.
1 ° 6 /d. at 639.
' 67 1d.
1°s Id.
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brought to Berth 52 so it could be loaded on board a ship.'"
Sea-Land's representative suggested, however, that Johns had merely
been shuttling equipment between the two terminals on the return
trip.'" The court reasoned that if on the return trip Johns had been
hauling a crate destined to be loaded onto a vessel then he had in fact
been engaged in maritime employment, but that if he had merely
been shuttling equipment then he had not been engaged in maritime
employment."' The case was remanded to determine the nature of
the load Johns was carrying on the return trip.'"
It is submitted that the remand was unnecessary. The court's
concern for the nature of the load Johns was carrying on his return
trip constitutes too specific an inquiry into his activity at the time of in-
jury. A claimant's status simply should not be made to depend wholly
on the nature of the job being performed at the very moment of
injury." 3 The court reasoned that Johns would have been covered if
the accident had happened during the initial trip from Berth 52 to
Berth 90. 174. It did not consider whether Johns would have been cov-
ered on the return trip if he had been hauling no trailer at all and it
had been just his tractor that had tipped over. Clearly, however,
coverage must be found in such a situation, for to hold otherwise is to
imply that a hustler operation is covered when carrying a load to the
container marshalling area but is not covered when returning empty.
And since, logically, coverage should apply when a claimant is return-
ing empty from depositing cargo somewhere, there is no logical
reason to withhold coverage from Johns merely because he may have
taken a load of equipment back with him. Indeed, to deny coverage in
such a situation is to reward commercial inefficiency. It is not the
claimant's last act, but rather his overall function which is significant
to a consideration of whether coverage attaches.' 75 Thus, the inquiry
into the nature of the claimant's activity at the time of the injury can-
not become so narrow that the nature of his overall function becomes
lost. Otherwise, countless employees will be walking or driving in and
"9 1d.
"0
" 'Id
" 2 Id. at 640.
"'See Stockman, 539 F.2d at 275.
14 540 F.2d at 639.
1 '3 See Stockman, 539 F.2d at 275 ("Whether the status of at least a steady em-
ployee is that of a 'maritime' worker, including 'longshoreman', seems to us to require
looking at the nature of' his regularly assigned duties as a whole."). Illustrative of this
concept, and in sharp contrast to the Third Circuit's handling of the Johns' situation, is
the Fourth Circuit's treatment of the facts surrounding the injury to the hustler
operator Harris in I.T.O. . The panel opinion noted that Harris had been injured on
the return trip from the container marshalling area. 529 F.2d at 1082. The en banc opin-
ion, however, noted that he had been injured while taking a stuffed container to the
container marshalling area. 542 F.2d at 905. This loose handling of the facts suggests
that the Fourth Circuit was less concerned with whether Harris was coming or going,
full or empty, at the time of the injury than it was with his overall function as a hustler
operator.
160
SH ORES! DE COVERAGE UNDER THE LH WC A
out of the Act's coverage all day long—exactly the situation which
Congress was attempting to prevent in enacting the 1972
amendments.' 78 Moreover, it may well be that the "at the time of in-
jury" test should be considered an 'unacceptable construction of "en-
gaged in" no matter how it is applied, for it seems destined to pro-
duce harsh and somewhat fortuitous results. If a claimant spends
ninety-nine percent of his time as a starer and only one percent of'
his time hauling equipment, but he is injured while hauling equip-
ment, then he is not "engaged in" maritime employment under the
test and hence is not an employee entitled to recover under the Act.
Although that result seems inequitable, the Fifth Circuit reached just
such a conclusion when faced with a similar Fact situation' In
Jacksonville.
Charles Skipper was a welder at the Jacksonville Shipyards.' 77
His usual duties were those of a ship repairman.'" Upon reporting to
work one morning, however, he was assigned to assist in tearing down
a building for the purpose of salvaging some steel.'" He was injured
by several steel fragments which struck his Forehead when some
beams fell from the building during the dismantling process.' 8 ° Refus-
ing to attach any weight to Skipper's regular job classification as a ship
repairman, the Fifth Circuit determined his status as an employee
solely on the basis of his duties at the time of the injury.'" The court
concluded that the salvage work in question was neither within any of
the examples of maritime employment specified in the Act nor suffi-
ciently similar to the statutory categories that it could be considered as
encompassed within the general congressional intent.'" Hence, the
court found that Skipper was not an employee under the Act,' 88
The Jacksonville result is needlessly inequitable. The mere fact
that a claimant may not have been engaged in maritime
employment' 84 precisely at the moment of injury should not be
deemed to foreclose recovery under the Act. Certainly the Act itself
contains no such stipulation. The source of the "at the time of injury"
test.'" is the committee reports, specifically the statement that, "The
Committee does not intend to cover employees who are not engaged
in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel, just because
they are injured in an area adjoining navigable waters used for such
176 See Pittston, 544 F.2(1 al 54; Sea -Land, 540 F.2d ;d 637.
In 539 F.2d at 542.
178
"a Id.
' 8° Id.
' 8 ' Id.
IN2
' 83 1d.
1" It is by no means certain that Skipper's demolition work was not, in fact.,
maritime employment. See, e.g., Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's Compen-
sation Act After the 1972 If rttendmerds, 6 J. of Mar. L. & Coin. 1, 10-11 (1974).
"5 See fack.sonville, 539 F.2d at 539.
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activity." 1 6 Not only does this language fail to establish "at the time of
injury" as the intended meaning of "engaged in", but rather it actually
seems-to indicate a far different meaning when read in the context of
the entire reports. The reports go on to say, "[t]hus, employees whose
responsibility is only to pick up stored cargo for further trans-
shipment would not be covered, nor would purely clerical employees
whose jobs do not require them to participate in the loading or un-
loading of cargo."'" By specifically limiting the exclusion to persons
whose responsibility is "only" to pick up stored cargo, and to persons
whose "purely" clerical work does not require them to even "partici-
pate" in the loading or unloading of cargo, Congress seems to have
indicated that persons who perform such work only some of the time
may qualify for coverage. Hence, it seems that not one hundred per-
cent of every employee's time need be spent in the activities specified
as maritime employment in order to be protected by the Act. Conse-
quently, instead of looking only to the time of injury, it seems that in
determining whether a claimant is "engaged in maritime employment",
the court should look to "the nature of his regularly assigned duties as
a whole."'"
It is suggested therefore that the language "employees who are
not engaged in loading, unloading ..." should not be interpreted as
excluding a person from coverage merely because he was not per-
forming a maritime function at the exact moment of injury. Rather, a
claimant should be considered "engaged in maritime employment"
under the Act if he is customarily engaged in maritime employment.
The amendments are, after all, an attempt to correct the fortuitous
nature of coverage under the Act. 1 B 6 Indeed, the basic purpose be-
hind the amended coverage was to structure a "uniform compensation
system.""° As Judge Friendly has pointed out, Congress wished to
minimize those occasions in which a longshoreman would find himself
covered under the LHWCA at one moment and under a state com-
pensation law the next.'" Interpreting the Act to require that the
claimant be engaged in maritime employment at the time of his in-
jury, however, simply substitutes the new fortuitous circumstance of
when an injury occurs for the former fortuitous circumstance of where
it occurred."' For this reason, it is submitted that a claimant should
'sg H. R, REP. No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE Cow.,
& AD, NEWS 4698, 4708.
"T Id.
188 Stockman, 539 F.2d at 275.
I" H.R. REP, No, 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEWS 4698, 4708.
' 9 ° Id.
Pittston, 544 F.2d at 54.
'"' Relevant here is the constantly varying nature of employment on the docks.
As one commentator has noted, "The almost infinite range of the conditions of water-
front employment has been detailed in thousands of cases." GILMORE & BLACK, supra
note 12, § 6-51, at 430. Not only are the many "shape-up" employees hired for only a
day at a time, e.g. Caputo in Pittston and Johns in Sea-Land, but even for a worker stead-
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be considered an employee under the Act if he was performing a
maritime employment function at the time of his injury or if he is cus-
tomarily engaged in maritime employment.
II. THE SITUS REQUIREMENT
Compensation is payable under the LHWCA upon the disability
or the death of an employee, "but only if the disability or death re-
sults from an injury occurring upon the navigable waters of the
United States (including any adjoining pier, wharf, dry dock, termi-
nal, building way, marine railway, or other adjoining area customarily
used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or building a
vessel)...."'" Application of this amended situs requirement has
been neither as frequent nor as difficult a problem as the determina-
tion of employee status, perhaps due to the very breadth of the
parenthetical extension itself.'"
The only appellate court to date to find the situs requirement
unsatisfied is the Fifth Circuit in Jacksonville. The Jacksonville court
concluded that two of the five claimants before it had not been in-
jured on a covered situs.'" A shipfitter at the Mayport Naval Station
in Jacksonville injured his left knee when he stumbled and fell to the
pavement while getting off his employer's bus.'" The bus had taken
the claimant from the aircraft carrier on which he was working to an
office maintained by his employer a mile away where he was required
to punch out.'" The office area where he was injured was a purely
clerical and administrative post located five hundred yards from the
nearest body of water.' 98 None of the facilities which separated the
office from the water were used for loading, unloading, repairing or
building vessels.'"" The court found that under no reasonable con-
ily employed by a single employer there may be little continuity in the type of assign-
ments he is called upon to perform, e.g., Skipper in Jacksonville. Hence, it seems quite
likely that Congress intended the principle of uniformity to apply not only to a
maritime worker's activities during the course of' a single day, but also to his activities
day in and day out.
' 93 LHWCA § 3(a), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp. 1976).
194 It should be noted that the Benefits Review Board has adopted a broad con-
struction of the situs requirement. In Sea-Land, the Board noted that,
The situs of the claimant's injury qualifies ... since it is directly related to,
and an essential part of, the employer's longshoring operations. To hold
otherwise would contravene the legislative intent of the 1972 amendments
to the Act, which were enacted, in part, to eliminate the circumstance of
having persons engaged in maritime employment walk into and out of the
Act's coverage during the workday. 2 BEES 65, 67-68 (1975).
Although this comment will arrive at a similarly broad statement of the Act's covered
situs. the Board decisions wilt be neither discussed nor relied on for support. See discus-
sion at note 43 supra.
19 ' 539 F.2d at 541-43.
1 " Id. at 541.
1971d .
' 98 Id. at 542 n.23.
199 1d. at 542.
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struction of the Act did the office area in question either adjoin
navigable waters or carry out any of the functions specified in the Act.
Rejecting the argument that the amended situs area included every
point in a large marine facility where an otherwise qualified employee
might go at his employer's direction, the court concluded that
the location of the shipfitter's injury did not satisfy the situs
requirement.20°
The second claimant whom the court found did not satisfy the
situs test was a ship repairman temporarily assigned to assist in tear-
ing down a building for the purpose of salvaging stee1. 20 ' The build-
ing which the claimant was tearing down when injured was located
about two hundred feet from the water's edge in a marine facility
called the Southside Yard, situated just across the St. Johns River
from the rest of the Jacksonville shipyarcls. 202 Although the building
had formerly housed a fabrication shop, there was no repair or fabri-
cation work actually being performed there at the time of the injury,
since all of the shops in the Yard had previously been closed down. 20"
The Southside pier, however, was still used to tie up ships which were
undergoing repair. 204 The court reasoned that in determining
whether a situs was covered under the Act it had to look past an
area's formal nomenclature to see whether that area was in fact cus-
tomarily used by an employer in loading, unloading, repairing, or
building a vessel as of the time of the injury. 205 Noting that the shops
in the Southside Yard had been inactive for a year prior to the injury,
and that there was no ship repair or shipbuilding activity actually
being performed in those buildings as of the time of the injury, the
court concluded that the shops had lost their status as a covered
sit us. 20 °
It is submitted that the Jacksonville court's approach represents
far too conservative a construction of the situs requirement. Not only
is the reasoning unpersuasive, but the results are unacceptable. The
Act's coverage was amended in an attempt to prevent the inequities
which had arisen when employees walked in and out of the Act's
coverage during the course of a day's work. 20 ' Yet, the court specifi-
cally provides for just that situation by summarily concluding that the
situs area does not cover all those points in a terminal where an
otherwise qualified employee might be required to work by his em-
ployer. Moreover, the court's conclusion that the specific locus at
which the claimant was injured must have been customarily used for
loading, unloading, repairing, or building a vessel seems to require
200 a
241 Id. See text at note 177 supra for an expanded discussion of the facts.
202 539 F.2d at 542.
109 id,
20+
205 1d. at 541.
"" Id. at 543.
"'See cases cited at note 176 supra.
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more of a claimant than does the Act itself. The Act specifically states
that coverage is extended to any adjoining ... terminal, ... or other
adjoining area customarily used ...." 299 Thus it seems that only "other
adjoining area[s]" need be used in a particular way, for any adjoining
terminal is covered. Still, even if an adjoining terminal must in fact be
customarily used for loading, unloading, repairing or building a ves-
sel, it seems only logical to require that merely part of that terminal
need be so used in order that the entire terminal area qualify as a
situs invoking the Act's protections. 209
In light of this reading of the situs requirement, it is submitted
that both claimants in Jacksonville satisfied the situs requirement. The
shipfitter fulfills that test in two ways. First, it appears that the berth
where he performed his ship repair work and- the office area where
he was injured are both part of the same Mayport Naval Station
facility. 210 As such, the court should not have required that the office
area itself be customarily used for loading, unloading, repairing, or
building a vessel. Since the injury occurred on a marine terminal ad-
joining navigable waters, part of which was used for ship repair work,
the situs test was satisfied. 2 " Secondly, even if the office area and the
berth are not part of the same 'terminal, the office area nontheless
appears to constitute part of an "other adjoining area customarily
used by an employer in ... repairing a vessel." The punch-out office
and the facilities which separated it from the water constituted an
area adjoining navigable waters, and as part of its ship repair busi-
ness, the claimant's employer required its employees to punch the
time clock at the office twice each day. Thus, it. seems that the office
area was in fact an area adjoining navigable waters, and was "cus-
tomarily used" by an employer in repairing vessels. The Southside
Yard situs of the ship repairman's injury should also have been found
to satisfy the situs test. The Yard appears to qualify as a covered situs
not only because of the continued use of part of that area 2 ' 2—the
Southside pier—but also because of the continued use of the facilities
on the other side of the St. Johns River. 2 "
It is suggested, therefore, that the Jacksonville court adopted too
restrictive a view of the situs area covered under the Act. A more ap-
propriate construction of the situs requirement is that fashioned by
the First, Second, and Fourth Circuits. Concluding in I.T.O. that the
area covered' under the Act included two warehouses, 685 feet and
850 feet respectively from the water's edge , 2I 4 theI Fourth Circuit
noted that at a minimum the claimants had been injured at a terminal
which adjoined navigable waters and was used in the overall process
2°8 LHWCA § 3(a), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
2 " See, Pittston, 544 F.2d at 51 n.19.
2 "See 539 F.2d at 541-42.
2" Cf., Pittston, 544 F.2d al 51 n.19.
2121d.
113 See textual discussion at note 220, infra.
"4 529 F.2c1 at 1082.
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of loading and unloading a vessel. 215 The court thus had no doubt
that the claimants had satisfied the situs test. 216 In Pittston, the Second
Circuit saw no question that both the checker injured on the string-
piece of the pier, and the cargo-handler injured inside the consignee's
truck further back in the terminal area, had satisfied the situs test. 217
Indeed, the court rejected the argument that the checker had not
been injured within the situs area simply because the pier on which he
was injured was used solely for stuffing and stripping activities and
not for the actual loading and unloading of vessels. 218 Judge
Friendly's broad language in Pittston is offered as a good illustration
of the liberal construction which should be afforded the situs test:
It would seem that any pier next to the water is included
within the situs definition The entire terminal adjoined
the water and was enclosed by a single gate ....[Claimant]
was clearly on a "pier" and a "terminal" adjoining the
water, a part of which was used for loading and unloading ves-
sels. This is sufficient. 2 "
The First Circuit, in Stockman, has followed the Fourth and the
Second Circuits in adopting this broad construction of the situs re-
quirement. The claimant was injured while stripping a container
which had been trucked from the unloading site at the Castle Island
pier to the stripping area at the Boston Army Base, a distance of two
miles by land and 700 to 800 feet across the water. 22 ° The court
reasoned that Congress had not intended to limit coverage only to
those areas directly adjoining the berth of the specific vessel being
unloaded. 22 ' Noting that the claimant had not been injured at some
inland freight depot having only an incidental connection with navi-
gable waters, but rather at a location which was "generally part of the
same Boston waterfront area,"222 the court concluded that the situs
requirement had plainly been met. 223
The majority of those jurisdictions which have considered the
question of coverage, then, have applied the situs requirement in a rel-
atively broad and liberal fashion. The restrictive view of the covered
situs area adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Jacksonville represents an
unwarranted departure from that developing standard. An even more
anomalous departure, however, is the refusal of the Third Circuit in
Sea-Land to apply the situs test at all. There, the shuttle-run which
Wallace Johns drove between Sea-Land's two terminals followed the
" 2 Id. at 1083-84.
218 Id.
2" Pittston, 544 F.2d at 51.
" 8 Id. at 51 n.19.
"2 Id. (emphasis added).
220 539 F.2d at 266.
221
	 at 272.
222 Id.
223 Id.
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public streets of Port Elizabeth, New Jersey for more than a mile and
a half. 224 Port Elizabeth is part of the sprawling marine terminal area
operated by the Port of New York and New Jersey Authority. 225
Johns' truck overturned at the intersection of Rangoon and Bombay
Streets, a distance of one-half mile from the water and one-third mile
from the nearest of Sea-Land's terminals. 225
The Sea-Land court followed a rather tortuous and somewhat
unnecessary route in concluding that coverage under the Act was not
foreclosed by the fact that John's accident had occurred on a public
street over which his employer had no contro1. 227 The court reasoned
that it is the existence of the employer-employee relationship, and not
the situs of that relationship, which is significant for purposes of ad-
miralty jurisdiction. 2" The Act's reference to the navigable waters was
viewed as nothing more than a shorthand way of relating the
claimant's employment function to the jurisdictional nexus of water-
borne transportation. 229 From the legislative history, the court con-
cluded that the 1972 amendments were an attempt to structure a
more uniform federal compensation system so that maritime workers
would no longer move in and out of the Act's coverage during the
course of a day's work, 23 ° In the belief that Congress had fully exer-
cised its legislative jurisdiction in admiralty, the court concluded that
the amended act was intended to provide a federal workmen's com-
pensation remedy for all maritime employees."' Consequently, the
Sea-Land court asserted that as long as the employment nexus with
maritime activity was maintained, i.e., as long as the status test was
satisfied, then the situs requirement should not be allowed to interfere
with Congress' attempt to eliminate the phenomenon of shifting
coverage. 232 The court therefore considered the line delimiting the
reach of the Act's shoreside coverage to be "functional and not
spatial." 233 The key to coverage was seen as the functional relationship
of the employee's activity to maritime transportation, and not the situs
of that maritime employee at the time of his injury. 234 Hence the ex-
tent of coverage was defined not by reference to a geographic rela-
tionship with the navigable waters, but rather by the location of the
interface between waterborne modes of transportation and land or
airborne modes of transportation. 235 The Third Circuit thus viewed
224 540 F.2d at 632.
'' Id. at 631.
222 Id. at 632.
227 Id. at 634-39.
22" Id. at 636.
"2 Id. at 638.
"° Id. at 637.
" Id. at 638.
232 Id.
222 Id. at 636.
"'Id. at 638.
23  Id.
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the situs test as being subsumed within a more significant status test.
The court's contention that this is what Congress really intended,
and that it is only poor draftsmanship which has obscured this
purpose, 236 is simply not persuasive. The Act specifically provides that
compensation is payable only for a disability or death which results
from "an injury occurring upon the navigable waters." 237 If any expla-
nation of the requirement is necessary, it could be, as Judge Friendly
has observed, that "Congress may have doubted its power, under the
admiralty clause of .Article III, to go further than it did." 238 Yet, the
Sea-Land court's rejection of the situs test is not only unwarranted in
the law, but is also unnecessary on the facts. The location of Johns' in-
jury clearly satisfied the situs test. The court itself recognized that the
intersection at which the accident took place was part of the marine
terminaI. 239 As Judge Friendly has noted, that is sufficient for
coverage.'" The fact that the accident occurred in an area over which
Sea-Land had no control is irrelevant, for a "terminal" is a covered
situs. Moreover, even as to "other adjoining areals]," the Act requires
merely that it be used by an employer and not that it be controlled by
the employer. 241
In summary, it is submitted that the amendments do present a
dual test for coverage, and that a claimant must be found to satisfy
the separate situs requirement in order to qualify for compensation
under the Act. Basic to the amendments, however, was Congress' con-
viction that coverage under a maritime worker's compensation system
should not be made to depend primarily on the situs of the claimant's
injury. Consequently, the covered area was greatly expanded so that
maritime workers would no longer move in and out of the Act's
coverage during the course of a day's work. For this reason, the situs
requirement should be liberally construed. It should be found satis-
fied wherever possible, thereby making the claimant's status as a
maritime employee the primary factor in determining coverage under
the Act.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the 1972 amendments should not be read
narrowly, for the LHWCA is remedial legislation which must be liber-
ally construed. 242 A liberal reading of the amended Act is further
supported by the fact that the extension of coverage to shoreside
areas was prompted not merely by the enormous disparity between
state and federal benefits which the Act's improved benefit structure
256 Id.
" T LH WCA § 3(a), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp. 1976) (emphasis added).
"" Pittston, 544 F.2d at 53.
2" 540 F.2d at 632.
"" Pittston, 544 F.2d at 51 n.19.
"" LHWCA § 3(a), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a) (Supp. 1976).
' 42 Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953). See also note 58 supra.
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would produce, but also by the fact that those state payments were
unconscionably low to begin with. 243 In light of its explicit recognition
of and concern for the inadequate benefits being paid injured
longshoremen under the various state laws, it is highly unlikely that
Congress would have intended only a limited extension of the more
generous federal coverage. 244 Rather, it is more logical to conclude
that Congress intended to create a widely available federal compensa-
tion remedy for maritime workers. 245 The amended act is no longer
merely a Jensen stop-gap measure; it is an affirmative federal compen-
sation scheme246 the shoreside coverage of which should be construed
as broadly as possible, consistent with the Act's humanitarian purpose.
ROBERT PATRICK CORCORAN
"' After discussing the federal-state disparity the committee reports continued,
"To make matters worse, most State Workmen's Compensation laws provide benefits
which are inadequate; even the better State laws generally come nowhere close to meet-
ing the National Commission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws recommended
standard ...." H.R. Rep, No. 1441, 92d Cong., 2d Scss„ reprinted in 11972] U.S. Cool:
CONG. & An, News 4698, 4699.
2" In fact, the committee reports expressly noted that the past disparity in pay-
ments had been a product of not only' which side of the water's edge the injury oc-
curred on, but of which state the injury occurred in as well, Id. at 4707, Moreover, the
reports noted that the disparity would continue to be substantial "if State laws are per-
mitted to continue to apply to injuries occurring on land." Id.
24i Senator Williams, the sponsor of the 1972 amendments, noted that they were
a model for the attempt to upgrade workmen's compensation programs, "including if
necessary the imposition of Federal standards." 118 CONG. REC. 36270 (1972).
""See Stockman, 539 F.2d at 271; Pittston, 544 F.2d at 54; Sea-Land, 540 F.2d at
636.
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